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I. INTRODUCTION
There has been much debate and discussion about the insurance
“tripartite” relationship during the past few years,1 as well as a lot of
misunderstanding about the role of attorney ethics within that
relationship. The authors would like to let the readers in on a secret:
other than the fancy term used to describe it, the tripartite
relationship is really no different from any other multiple-client
representation in which the clients agree to allocate among
themselves the responsibilities of managing the litigation and
decisionmaking.2
When a claim is made against an insured person under a typical
liability policy, a tripartite relationship is established between an
insurance company, its insured, and the defense attorney hired to
represent their joint interests in resolving the claim. The
relationship is one that has existed and worked well for decades. It
involves corresponding rights and obligations between the insurer
and insured outlined in the insurance policy and obligations
undertaken by the insurer and common counsel in the retention
arrangement, as well as duties owed by the common counsel to both
clients under the attorney ethics rules. The nature of the relationship
is one of substantive contract law, with relevant concepts often
embedded in statutes, regulations, and case law.
1. See, e.g., INSURANCE PRACTICES SPECIAL STUDY COMM., THE FLA. BAR, REPORT OF
PRACTICES SPECIAL STUDY COMMITTEE 3 (June 2, 2000), www.flabar.org/
newflabar/images/downloads/rpts4fin.pdf [hereinafter IPSSC REPORT].
2. This Article assumes the formation of an attorney-client relationship between an
insurer and defense attorney when the defense attorney is hired by the insurer to defend a
covered claim against an insured. Such a relationship normally exists. See infra Appendix
A. While the authors would reach the same conclusions where the insurer is not a co-client
with its insured (i.e., where the insurer is the insured’s agent), the analysis differs under
the ethics rules and this Article does not attempt to undertake that analysis.
THE INSURANCE
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Recently, numerous state bar ethics advisory opinions and at least
one reported court decision have employed rather tortured analyses
to disrupt the well-functioning tripartite relationship, using “ethics”
concerns to indirectly place restraints on the role of insurers in the
tripartite relationship. These restraints include prohibitions against
two well-established litigation management practices: submission of
legal billing statements to auditing firms engaged by the insurer and
use of certain insurer litigation guidelines (such as a requirement
that counsel seek insurer approval before performing certain legal
tasks).
The state bar opinions, promulgated under the asserted umbrella
of attorney ethics, are flawed in a number of respects. First, the
opinions confuse contractual and ethical issues. Interfering with the
business relationships between attorneys and insurers, they serve
only to protect the economic interests of attorneys rather than
advance the interests of the insured-clients. Second, they ignore the
fundamental distinction between an attorney’s ability to exercise
independent professional judgment and a client’s right to decide
whether an attorney’s recommended course of action should be
implemented and legal fees for that action incurred.
Such prohibitions are not only ill supported, they are ill advised.
These practices—used by many noninsurer-clients as well—were
designed to institute a measure of efficiency and consistency among
retained defense firms, at the same time lowering the cost of
skyrocketing legal fees and curbing attorney billing abuses.
Eliminating these important safeguards threatens to artificially
standardize the cost of legal defense and correspondingly increase
liability insurance premiums for consumers.
Yet this is but one of several unintended consequences such
opinions may have for liability insurance in this nation. Others
include undermining an insured’s tort remedy of “bad faith” against
an insurer that manages the defense improperly; altering the terms
of state-approved insurance contracts; creating confusion in the
practical application of the defense clause in an insurance contract;
placing insureds in the untenable position of having to give specific,
informed consent as to issues about which they have little or no
knowledge—issues they believe they have agreed for the insurer to
handle; and even causing insureds to possibly forfeit the right to a
defense or to coverage. These are serious consequences, but they are
logical outgrowths of bar opinions that take such a myopic view of
attorney ethics.
In Florida, however, the issues may be starting to come into focus.
In 1999, The Florida Bar took an alternative approach to these issues
by appointing a special committee, the Insurance Practices Special

858

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:855

Study Committee (IPSSC), to study those issues.3 After intensely
studying the litigation management practices of insurance companies
for over a year, the IPSSC concluded that there was “little harm” to
insureds from the use of these practices.4 Indeed, the record before
the IPSSC reflects absolutely no evidence whatsoever of any harm to
any insureds as a result of these practices.5 The IPSSC recognized,
however, that as with any representation of a client where another
person or client is paying for the representation, the representation of
an insured client at the request of the insurer creates a particular
need for the attorney to be cognizant of the potential for ethical
risks.6
To facilitate the attorney’s performance of ethical responsibilities
in this regard and to assist Florida insurance consumers in
understanding their basic rights as clients, the IPSSC developed and
recommended the adoption of a disclosure statement, entitled
Statement of Insured Client’s Rights (“the Statement”).7 Rather than
restricting insurer litigation management practices and endangering
the tripartite relationship, the Statement would provide guidance to
defense attorneys and disclose information about the representation
to insureds.8 In addition, comments to the Statement provide the
basis for the adoption of similar statements for use in other recurring
multiple-client contexts.9
On June 2, 2000, The Florida Bar accepted the recommendation of
the IPSSC, voting to recommend amendment of Rule 4-1.8 of the
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar to require use of the statement.10
The proposed amendment is scheduled to come before the Florida
Supreme Court later this summer. If adopted by the Florida
Supreme Court as a new rule, this unique approach will be the first

3. See Gary Blankenship, Insurance Practices Study Launched, FLA. BAR NEWS
(Aug. 1, 1999), http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/publicmediainfo/TFBNews/aug1-2.html
(last visited Oct. 28, 2000).
4. IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
5. The IPSSC report states that it found “little harm” to insureds from insurer
litigation management practices. The record before the IPSSC, however, reflects not one
instance of any harm whatsoever to any insured. See Record of IPSSC (available at The
Fla. Bar).
6. See id. at 20-21.
7. See id. at 17-22.
8. See id. at 20-21. Insurance industry associations originally opposed the Statement
as being discriminatory against insurers. However, because the Bar was willing to accept
input from the insurance industry in developing a statement that was workable, and
because the Statement did not contradict established law or policy and did not otherwise
jeopardize the ability of insurers to freely offer insurance products to Florida consumers,
the industry associations working with the Bar agreed not to contest implementation of the
Statement.
9. See IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 20.
10. See Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar
(June 2, 2000), www.flabar.org/newflabar/organization/Board/jun00min.html.
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of its kind and a level-headed response to the hysteria that has
preceded issuance of some state bar ethics opinions.
Using Florida law as a model, Part II of this Article outlines the
rights and duties that constitute the tripartite relationship, as
established by relevant case law and ethics rules, and defines the
proper role of the ethics rules in the context of that relationship. Part
III describes current litigation management practices of insurers and
others, with particular attention to the guidelines and auditing
procedures which have been the subject of the recent controversy.
Part IV then turns to the recent ethics opinions addressing these
practices, analyzing them in light of the principles outlined in Part II
and concluding that they reflect an inherently flawed approach. Part
V then outlines the investigation and sound reasoning behind the
Statement of Insured Client’s Rights. Finally, Part VI concludes that
with no evidence of actual ethical violations or harm to insureds,
there is no reason to inject these types of economic and contractual
issues into the arena of ethics regulation. It applauds the policy of
full disclosure embodied in the Statement and urges the Florida
Supreme Court to adopt it.
II. THE TRIPARTITE RELATIONSHIP
To properly evaluate the ethical and economic debate that has
marked this setting, it is important to first understand the
relationships at issue and the proper role each party plays. Any
approach to the current issues which ignores these now wellestablished roles would create unnecessary and inappropriate
tension with settled law, with far-reaching consequences. Conversely,
examining this “tripartite” relationship will reveal several principles
which can guide an analysis of the issues.
A. The Contractual Relationships
The aptly named insurance “tripartite” relationship involves, not
surprisingly, three parties: (1) the insurance company that issues the
liability insurance policy; (2) the insured against whom a claim is
filed that is covered under the insurance policy; and (3) the attorney
hired by the insurance company to defend the claim and represent
the aligned interest of the insurer and insured. An important point,
all too frequently ignored, is that these relationships are creatures of
contract. The relationship between an insurer and a defense attorney
arises from two separate, yet interrelated, contractual relationships.
The first contract is the insurance policy between the insurer and the
insured. The second contract is the retainer agreement between the
insurer and the defense attorney.
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1. The Insurance Contract
Through the insurance policy between insurer and insured, the
insured purchases more than reimbursement for damages. The policy
also requires the insurer to provide a defense against any covered
claim filed against the insured.11 Under most policies, the insurer
must provide a defense even where the allegations against the
insured are false, fraudulent, or groundless.12 In exchange for the
duty to provide a good faith defense for the insured, most liability
policy defense clauses give the insurer the right to control the
litigation.13 That is, in exchange for the insurer’s broad defense
obligations, the insured agrees to cede control of the defense to the
insurer and agrees to cooperate in that defense.14
Florida, like most states, has repeatedly reaffirmed these
contractual underpinnings. For instance, in discussing the insurer’s
responsibilities under the insurance contract, the Florida Supreme
Court stated as early as 1969 that “for a consideration it is
contemplated that a business entity contracts to provide certain
protection, including legal services, to its customers.”15 In that same
opinion, the court emphasized that it is “the insurance contract
which delineates the rights and duties of insurer and insured
between themselves.”16
More recently, the court expounded on those rights and duties:
In fulfilling its promissory obligation to defend, the insurer
employs counsel for the insured, performs the pretrial
investigation, and controls the insured’s defense after a suit is filed
on a claim. The insurer also makes decisions as to when and when
not to offer or accept settlement of the claim.17

Thus, under the typical policy, an insured surrenders control over the
handling of the claim, including all decisions with regard to litigation
and settlement.18 In return, the insurer undertakes the quasifiduciary obligation to conduct the litigation in good faith and with
due regard for the interests of the insured.19

11. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Allstate Ins. Co., 653 So. 2d 371, 373 (Fla. 1995).
12. See Schuster v. South Broward Hosp. Dist. Physicians’ Prof’l Liab. Ins. Trust, 591
So. 2d 174, 176 (Fla. 1992).
13. See id.
14. See Kent D. Syverud, The Ethics of Litigation Management Guidelines and Legal
Audits, 21 Ins. Litig. Rep. (CBC) 180, 187 (May 1, 1999).
15. In re Proposed Addition to the Additional Rules Governing the Conduct of Att’ys
in Fla., 220 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla. 1969).
16. Id.
17. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Allstate Ins. Co., 653 So. 2d 371, 373-74 (Fla. 1995).
18. See Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. 1980);
Hollar v. International Bankers Ins. Co., 572 So. 2d 937, 938-39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
19. See Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d at 785; Hollar, 572 So. 2d at 938-39.

2001]

TRIPARTITE RELATIONSHIP

861

Importantly, the insurer’s contractual defense obligation is not
merely a requirement to fund the defense. Insurers are required to
protect their policyholders’ interests to the same degree that they
protect their own interests and to make independent decisions about
the goals of the litigation and the means to fulfill those goals.20 In a
litigation context, this is a major element of the duty of good faith
owed by every insurer to its insureds.
Insurers cannot delegate this obligation to counsel, nor can they
escape responsibility for an adverse result by looking to the defense
attorney.21 Should the insurer ignore these obligations, the insured
can sue for breach of contract and associated damages.22 Accordingly,
under the contractual relationship between the insurer and the
insured, the insurer protects its interests and the interests of its
insured by assuming control of the defense and related costs.23 As a
result, the insurer ordinarily must protect its insured in order to
protect itself. Thus, the insurer and insured have a common interest
in securing quality representation in order to keep the settlement or
verdict as low as possible.
2. The Retainer Agreement: The Contractual Relationship
Between the Insurer-Client and the Defense Attorney
Of course, the defense attorney hired by the insurer is not a party
to the insurance contract. The formation of the attorney-client
relationship and related contractual rights and obligations between
the attorney and the insurer arise from the agreement under which
an insurer retains the attorney. In the insurance defense context,
this agreement defines the terms and conditions under which the
attorney will provide representation with respect to a covered
claim.24
Those terms and conditions commonly include certain litigation
guidelines (including legal audit procedures), which are appended to,
and form an integral part of, that contract. These guidelines assist

20. See Schuster v. South Broward Hosp. Dist. Physicians’ Prof’l Liab. Ins. Trust, 591
So. 2d 174, 176 (Fla. 1992).
21. See Doe, 653 So. 2d at 374.
22. See Time Ins. Co. v. Burger, 712 So. 2d 389, 392 (Fla. 1998); North Am. Van Lines,
Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 678 So. 2d 1325, 1330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); see also FLA. STAT. §
624.155(1)(b)(1) (2000) (stating that the insured can sue the insurer if the insurer does not
attempt to settle in good faith when the insurer could or should have done so).
23. See Doe, 653 So. 2d at 373-74.
24. See Richard E. Mulroy, Issues of Outside Counsel Management, ACCA DOCKET,
May/June 1995, at 28, 29 (“Formal written retention documents are widely used. These
include written engagement letters, billing policy statements, or a combination of both at
the onset of any engagement. The intent of these documents is to describe the nature and
scope of the engagement for the benefit of all parties.”).
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the insurer in fulfilling its contractual obligations to the insured,25
namely, controlling the litigation and ensuring quality
representation. Even in the atypical situation where the insured
faces exposure in excess of policy limits, the insurer has both the
incentive and the obligation to provide the insured with a proper
defense.26 Such guidelines are thus an important facet of both
contractual relationships.
A significant feature of the retainer agreement in this context is
the dual nature of the representation the defense counsel
undertakes. In the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, the
attorney, either explicitly or implicitly, represents the common,
aligned interests of both the insurer and the insured.27 As the Florida
Supreme Court has confirmed, “‘the legal responsibility placed on the
insurance company give[s] pointed verification to the fact that the
interest involved in defense of liability suits is primarily and
ultimately the interest of the insurance company.’”28 Thus, the
defense counsel may appropriately represent the interests of both the
insurer and the insured so long as those interests are not in actual
conflict.29 This is true regardless of whether the attorney is employed
staff counsel or retained outside counsel.30
In part, this now long-settled principle is premised on the fact
that the vast majority of insured lawsuits involve claims fully
covered by the policy and, therefore, the possibility of actual conflict
is minimal.31 Indeed, defense by an attorney representing both the
insured and the insurer necessarily involves a case in which no
collision of interests has occurred between the insurer and the
insured that would create a material, irreconcilable conflict for the
defense attorney in the representation.32 Thus, unless and until an
actual conflict of interest occurs, the insurance company’s status as a
client of defense counsel is secured as a matter of contract.

25. See, e.g., Shuster, 591 So. 2d at 176-77 (finding that the insurer has exclusive
authority to control settlement and be guided by its own self-interest where the language
of the policy puts the insured on notice of the insurer’s right to do so). Under the most
common policies, the insured being defended under an existing policy is indifferent to the
costs of defense because the insurer must pay those without affecting the limits applicable
to indemnification against judgments or settlements. However, some policies subtract
defense costs from the limits or require the insured to contribute to those costs.
26. See Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the Company or the
Insured?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1583, 1595-96 (1994).
27. See infra Appendix A.
28. In re Proposed Addition to the Additional Rules Governing the Conduct of Att’ys
in Fla., 220 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla. 1969).
29. See id. at 8 (citing a brief filed by Liberty Mutual Insurance).
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
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B. Ethical Obligations in the Contractual Relationship
The contractual relationships outlined above are fully consistent
with the rules governing the professional conduct of attorneys.33 In
particular, application of Florida’s ethics rules, found in the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar,34 to the tripartite relationship
demonstrates that neither the policy obligations of the insurer and
insured nor the standard retainer agreement violate the attorney’s
duties to maintain confidentiality and remain free of conflicting
interests.
1. Confidentiality
Under the ethics rules, information may be shared between coclients and their representatives by the attorney hired to represent
them. Under Rule 4-1.6 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, the
attorney must maintain the confidences of the attorney-client
relationship.35 This is true in any attorney-client relationship.36
However, subsection (c) allows disclosure “to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary . . . to serve the client’s interest unless
it is information the client specifically requires not to be disclosed.”37
Thus, Rule 4-1.6 expressly permits disclosures “impliedly authorized”
by the client.38 A “lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures
about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation,
except to the extent that the client’s instructions or special
circumstances limit that authority.”39 The reporter for the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (from which chapter 4 of the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar was derived) has explained that “[t]his
standard is taken from the law of agency, under which implied
authority is inferred from the nature of the representation, the
‘general usages’ of similar relationships, and those acts which
‘usually accompany’ or are ‘reasonably necessary’ to the represen-

33. Even in those few states where the insurer is not recognized as a co-client, the
insurer’s role in the ethics constellation is resolved by noting that the insured, by entering
into an insurance contract, “waives” certain ethical rights the insured might normally
have. See, e.g., Atlanta Int’l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W.2d 294 (Mich. 1991). In Bell, Chief
Justice Cavanagh’s dissent—which disagreed with the majority only on its equitable
subrogation ruling—reaffirms the coexistence of an attorney’s contractual and ethical
obligations to both the policyholder and the insurer, as well as the policyholder’s consent to
forego certain ethical rights during the representation. See id. at 299-304 (Bell, J.,
dissenting).
34. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR ch. 4, http://www.flabar.org/lawpractice/Rules/rrtfbch4.
pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
35. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6.
36. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6 cmt.
37. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6(c).
38. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6 cmt.
39. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 7 (1998).
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tation.”40 Absent some concrete and substantial risk of harm to the
insured, all that is required is utility or convenience in carrying out
the representation.41 Nor is there risk to the attorney-client privilege:
because the insurer and the insured are co-clients of defense counsel,
under the “common interest” doctrine, shared information is
protected.42
When read together with the insured’s contractual obligation of
cooperation with the insurer, this suggests that only if the attorney
learns of information detrimental to the insured, or if the insured
specifically asks that certain information be kept confidential from
the insurer, must the attorney decline to share that information with
the insurer. Otherwise, the information should be provided to the
insurer to allow the insurer to properly manage the defense,
including paying the attorney for appropriate legal services.
2. Duty of Loyalty
Under Rule 4-1.7, the attorney may represent multiple clients so
long as their interests are aligned.43 Obviously, when an actual
conflict arises in the joint representation of the insurer and the
insured, the attorney must refrain from representing the interests of
one of the parties.44 However, this is true in any attorney-client
relationship where the attorney represents two or more clients in the
same representation.45
In discussing the joint representation of the insurer and the
insured, the Florida Supreme Court has noted that “[i]f the
representation initially contemplates professional services to two
clients with a mutuality of interests, the attorney carries the burden
of clearly and distinctly disassociating himself from his allegiance to
40. Opinion of Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. at 27, In re Rules of Prof’l Conduct and Insurer
Imposed Billing Rules and Procedures, 2 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2000) (No. 98-612) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 33-35 (1958)), State Law Library of Mont.,
http://www.lawlibrary.state.mt.us/dscgi/ds.py/view/Collection-1831.
41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 cmt. g
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 398 (1995) (stating that a lawyer may disclose billing information to an outside
service bureau to prepare bills).
42. See FLA. STAT. § 90.502(4)(e) (2000) (“(4) There is no lawyer-client privilege under
this section when: . . . (e) A communication is relevant to a matter of common interest
between two or more clients, or their successors in interest, if the communication was
made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common when offered in a civil
action between the clients or their successors in interest.”) (indicating that the common
interest doctrine protects shared client confidences unless and until a civil action arises
between the co-clients to which the confidences are relevant); see also Visual Scene, Inc. v.
Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
43. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.7, http://www.flabar.org/lawpractice/Rules/
rrtfbch4.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
44. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.7 cmt.
45. See id.
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one whenever the interests of the two cease to be mutual and come
into collision.”46 This is the same obligation imposed on any lawyer
who represents multiple clients, and it is triggered only when “a
conflict of interests between clients appears.”47 Thus, under the
ethics rules, a defense attorney is to represent the interests of both
the insurer and the insured just as the attorney would do in any
other multiple-client representation.
The tripartite relationship is also fully consistent with Rule 41.8(f),48 which governs when an attorney can accept compensation for
representing a client from a third party, and which mirrors the thirdparty compensation rules of many other states.49 That rule provides
that such an arrangement cannot compromise the attorney’s duty of
loyalty to the client.50 First, as noted, the insurer is not simply a
third party paying the compensation for the representation under
Rule 4-1.8; rather, the insurer is a client of defense counsel so long as
the interests of the insurer and the insured are aligned and there is
no actual conflict at issue in the representation.51 As noted in the
comments to Rule 4-1.7, which actually contemplate this joint
representation:
A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the
client is informed of that fact and consents and the arrangement
does not compromise the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the client. See
rule 4-1.8(f). For example, when an insurer and its insured have

46. In re Proposed Addition to the Additional Rules Governing the Conduct of Att’ys
in Fla., 220 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla. 1969).
47. Id. at 7.
48. Rule 4-1.8(f) provides as follows:
Compensation by Third Party. A lawyer shall not accept compensation for
representing a client from one other than the client unless:
(1) the client consents after consultation;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by
rule 4-1.6.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.8(f), http://www.flabar.org/lawpractice/rules/rrtfbch4.pdf (last
visited Jan. 2, 2001).
49. Rule 4-1.8(f) is drawn from Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(f) without
change.
50. See id.
51. Ironically, even some defense attorneys mistakenly believe they represent only
the insured. However, as pointed out by a recent Maryland ethics opinion, this assumption
conflicts with substantive law and could jeopardize some of the insured’s rights, especially
in the area of attorney-client privilege, when necessary information must be disclosed to
the insurer. See Md. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Ethics Docket 00-23 (2000), LEXIS,
Ethics Library, ETHOP File. Moreover, many defense firms actually list insurers as
“representative clients” on their brochures, websites, and Martindale-Hubbell listings. See,
e.g.,
Butler
Burnette
Pappas—Representative
Client
List,
at
http://www.bbplaw.com/clients.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2001); Search of MartindaleHubbell Lawyer Locator, at http://lawyers.martindale.com/Executable/Firm.php3 (Katz,
Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Bryant & Yon, P.A. listing) (last visited Jan. 31, 2001).
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conflicting interests in a matter arising from a liability insurance
agreement and the insurer is required to provide special counsel
for the insured, the arrangement should assure the special
counsel’s professional independence. So also, when a corporation
and its directors or employees are involved in a controversy in
which they have conflicting interests, the corporation may provide
funds for separate legal representation of the directors or
employees, if the clients consent after consultation and the
arrangement ensures the lawyer’s professional independence.52

As anticipated by this comment, until such time as the insurer and
its insured have conflicting interests, the insurer is a co-client.
However, once an actual conflict arises, the insurer may be required
to provide special counsel and be considered a third-party payor of
legal services.53
Also, as with all multiple-client representations, defense counsel
owes a duty of loyalty to both the insurer and the insured. Under the
ordinary insurance contract, the insurer has the responsibility to
protect the interests of the insured, but the insured has agreed to
allow the insurer, as a mutual co-client of the defense attorney and
as agent for the insured, to control the costs and management of the
litigation.54 The insurer has a right to control the litigation where the
policy so specifies.55 The fact that the insurer is paying the fees and
controlling the cost of litigation does not, in and of itself, in any way
compromise defense counsel’s loyalty to the insured-client. Thus, as
in any co-client representation where one client is authorized to
control the litigation, no ethical dilemma exists for the defense
counsel in adhering to an insurer’s decision regarding the defense
unless such decision actually impairs defense counsel’s duty of
loyalty to the insured. The defense attorney is faced with an ethical
decision only when the interests of the attorney’s two clients, the
insured and insurer, actually come into conflict.56
In short, the insurance contract ordinarily permits joint
representation of the insurer and insured as well as exercise of
52. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.7 cmt. (emphasis added), http://www.flabar.org/
lawpractice/rules/rrtfbch4.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
53. See id.
54. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Allstate Ins. Co., 653 So. 2d 371, 373-74 (Fla. 1995).
55. See Shuster v. South Broward Hosp. Dist. Physicians’ Prof’l Liab. Ins. Trust, 591
So. 2d 174, 176-77 (Fla. 1992).
56. See In re Proposed Addition to the Additional Rules Governing the Conduct of
Att’ys in Fla., 220 So. 2d 6, 7 (Fla. 1969). The Court stated:
The rule, as suggested, seems to emphasize the employer-employee
relationship as the element which would distinguish the lawyer’s responsibility
to one of two clients . . . .
. . . The point we make merely is that when a conflict does arise the ethical
decision which the lawyer faces is the same in both relationships—if he is
employed to represent two clients.
Id. (emphasis added).
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control by the insurer. Additionally, the retainer agreement between
the defense attorney and the insurer is consistent with, and is a
means of, complying with the conditions of the insurance contract.
Only if some concrete situation discloses a substantial risk of harm to
the insured arising from the insurer’s decisions is there an ethical
problem for the attorney.
III. LITIGATION MANAGEMENT PRACTICES57
A. The Benefits of Litigation Management Practices
Litigation management has become increasingly important in
recent years to all businesses, including insurers. Over the last thirty
years, American businesses and insurers have experienced an
unprecedented increase in litigation. The main reasons behind this
steady, at times explosive, growth have been the expansion of causes
of action and the liberalization of tort rights.
A sampling of the more significant legal developments include
adoption of strict liability for products;58 comparative negligence in
place of contributory negligence;59 environmental exposures;60
employment practice liabilities;61 expanded duties of directors and
officers to stockholders and customers;62 and availability of class
actions.63 Clearly, these expanded exposures have vastly increased
57. Part III has been adapted in significant part from the amicus brief filed by the
American Insurance Association (AIA) before the Montana Supreme Court in In Re Rules
of Professional Conduct and Insurer Imposed Billing Rules and Procedures, 2 P.3d 806
(Mont. 2000). That brief was submitted to the Court by Jacqueline T. Lenmark but was
authored primarily by instant author J. Stephen Zielezienski. Specifically, all portions of
that brief included herein were authored by Mr. Zielezienski. In its decision in the In Re
Rules of Professional Conduct, the Montana Supreme Court did not address the benefits of
litigation management practices. Further, as discussed infra at Part IV.B, the Montana
Supreme Court rejected AIA’s arguments based on its corresponding rejection of the dualclient status of the insurer and the insured in the tripartite relationship, which places
Montana in the very small minority of states rejecting the dual-client status of the insurer
and the insured.
58. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963).
59. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Cal. 1975); Hoffman v. Jones,
280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
60. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 96019626, 9651-9661, 9671-9675 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)); Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., 636 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1993).
61. See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6
(requiring employers to provide unpaid medical or pregnancy leave) (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 2105, 6301, 6381-6387 & 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994 & Supp. V 1999));
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, §§ 703(a), 704(a), 708 Stat. 253, 255,
257 (prohibiting sexual discrimination and retaliation, among other things) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), -3(a) (1994)).
62. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-74 (Del. 1985).
63. A survey conducted by the Federalist Society indicates that between 1988 and
1998 the number of class actions pending in state courts increased by 1315%, while the
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the cost to American business and insurers of defending themselves
and their insureds. A comprehensive study of the U.S. tort system
from 1930 to 1994 concluded:
tort costs have grown almost four times faster than the U.S.
economy over the past 64 years . . . .
....
The U.S. tort system is by far the most expensive in the
industrialized world . . . . [The cost of the U.S. tort system is]
substantially higher than that of any other country studied and
two and a half times the average.64

These data demonstrate that litigation has ceased to be a matter
of only occasional concern; it has become a major expense item in
annual budgets, necessitating comprehensive management controls.
Litigation management, by necessity, has become a full-time
enterprise within the enterprise, commonly requiring oversight of
millions, occasionally billions, of expense dollars as well as the
companion (and much greater) costs of settlements, verdicts, and
corporate reputation. As a part of litigation management, insurers
implement a number of tools, such as requiring outside counsel to
follow litigation management guidelines and hiring in-house or
retained auditors to review legal bills. In other instances, insurers
simply use in-house attorneys to handle the defense of covered
claims.
1. Litigation Management Guidelines
As noted earlier, litigation management guidelines are
frequently incorporated into the retention contract between the
insurer and the defense attorney. At the outset of the
representation, the attorney is typically provided with a copy of any
applicable guidelines and, in agreeing to undertake the
representation, the attorney agrees to abide by the cost controls set
forth in those guidelines. In all critical respects, insurer guidelines
bear a substantial resemblance to the guidelines used by other
entities. In fact, a number of issues typically discussed in litigation
guidelines have been specifically addressed and approved by case
law. For example, courts have uniformly denounced bills that
include incomplete or vague entries and have held it improper to

number in all federal courts increased by 340%. See Analysis: Class Action Litigation—A
Federalist Society Survey, Part II, CLASS ACTION WATCH, Spring 1999, at 1, 6, Federalist
Society, http://www.fed-soc.org/classaction1-2.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2000). Preliminary
findings for a second group of respondents indicated similar results: a 550% increase in the
number of pending state court class actions from 1988 to 1998. See id.
64. ROBERT W. STURGIS, TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, TORT COST TRENDS: AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (1995).
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charge multiple parties for work that has only been done once.65
Among other things, typical guidelines detail the entity’s right to be
consulted,66 what activities need prior approval,67 and how
attorneys will be compensated.68
Most importantly, all guidelines set forth the organization’s right
to control the decisions regarding the representation. For example,
CIBA-GEIGY Corporation’s litigation guidelines state, “The
Company is self-insured and exercises direct control of the liability
cases against it. Accordingly, we have an understanding with outside
counsel that retention of a firm is subject to our direct supervision
and control.”69 The guidelines stress, “All important decisions with
respect to the litigation are under our control.”70 Other corporate
litigation guidelines convey similar expectations.71
Exercise of this kind of meaningful control can be critical to an
entity confronted by litigation. For example, an entity may wish to
determine the way its positions in litigation or otherwise are

65. See H.J., Inc. v. Flygt Corp., 925 F.2d 257, 260 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming fee
reduction based on district court finding that numerous entries were inadequate and
vague); Lockheed Minority Solidarity Coalition v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 406 F.
Supp. 828, 832 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
66. See CIBA-GEIGY Corp., Litigation Procedures for Outside Counsel (July 1986)
(Guideline 3.1), in 1 Company Pol’y Statements (Bus. Laws, Inc.) 705 (1987) (“During the
first three months (90 days) following the assignment of a new case, your firm should
prepare, in consultation with us, an overall plan and budget for this litigation . . . .”
(emphasis added)); McDonnell Douglas Corp., Policies for Firms Providing Legal Services
to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, in 1 Company Pol’y Statements (Bus. Laws, Inc.) 735
(Apr. 1998) (“Outside counsel is required to communicate on a regular basis to the MDC
responsible attorney. The MDC responsible attorney should be immediately informed of all
court and discovery dates . . . .”).
67. See Chevron Corp., Chevron Corporation Guidelines for Outside Counsel
(Guideline F.2), in 1 Company Pol’y Statements (Bus. Laws, Inc.) 758 (June 1992)
(“Advance approval from the responsible Chevron attorney is required before you engage in
any of the following: (1) preparing pretrial motions that would resolve the matter . . . (3)
preparing discovery motions; . . . (5) selecting or retaining expert witnesses . . . .”); E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., Du Pont Guidelines for Outside Counsel (Guideline 4), in 1
Company Pol’y Statements (Bus. Laws, Inc.) 784 (June 1993) (“The Du Pont staff attorney
should participate in and approve in advance all decisions regarding important aspects of
the case and all projects that will require a significant expenditure of time and
resources.”).
68. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., Standards for Outside Counsel, in 1 Company Pol’y
Statements (Bus. Laws, Inc.) 791-92 (May 1995).
69. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., Litigation Procedures for Outside Counsel (July 1986)
(Principle 1), in 1 Company Pol’y Statements (Bus. Laws, Inc.) 702 (1987).
70. Id. (Principle 3).
71. See Coleman Co., Sample Engagement Letters and Billing Instruction Form, in 1
Company Pol’y Statements (Bus. Laws, Inc.) 738 (Apr. 1997) (“Except for the interests of
excess insurance carriers, we retain total control over this file.”). Some guidelines state
that decisions are made collaboratively by the corporation and the outside counsel. See,
e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp., Policies for Firms Providing Legal Services to McDonnell
Douglas Corporation, in 1 Company Pol’y Statements (Bus. Laws, Inc.) 735 (Apr. 1997)
(“Substantive pleadings . . . may not be filed or served in any matter until they have been
reviewed and approved by the [McDonell Douglas Corporation] responsible attorney.”).
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conveyed to the public. Provisions retaining control and requiring
consultation accomplish this objective. Often, through its experience
and familiarity with the circumstances surrounding the
representation, an entity is in a superior position to assess litigation
strategy, including which witnesses should be called and the areas in
which attorneys should focus their efforts.
In addition, for businesses and insurers that defend or prosecute
hundreds or thousands or tens of thousands of lawsuits each year,
two critical factors underlie their approach to litigation. One is the
need for consistency, both in approach and in quality. The other is
the need to achieve an acceptable balance between legal dollars
invested and the results returned on that investment.
Coupled with an auditing mechanism, litigation management
guidelines provide corporations and insurers the means of
implementing their litigation philosophies in a consistent manner.
Such guidelines further enable corporations and insurers to evaluate
the quality of legal representation both within and across
jurisdictional lines and to ascertain whether their legal dollars have
been expended according to their wishes. Chevron Corporation’s
guidelines, for example, under a category entitled “General
Expectations,” explain:
We want our relationship with outside counsel to be a close
working one, with expectations and duties running in both
directions. It is important that our communications be open and
direct. You should not be offended if we point out instances when
we believe your work has not been of the quality we expect or has
not been performed on a cost-effective basis. To the same extent,
we need to be told when we have failed to fulfill our obligations to
you (e.g., failure to provide timely or complete responses to
requests for information).72

Litigation guidelines used by Overnite Transportation Company, on
the other hand, approach the same goal from a different direction:
One of the realities of the trucking industry marketplace today
is intensely brutal competition. Essential to our success in this
environment are productivity and cost control. The need for
maximizing productivity and efficiency and minimizing cost
extends to every Overnite functional department, including the
law department and its outside counsel. To that end, it is essential
that every effort be made to hold down the cost of legal services.73

72. Chevron Corp., Guidelines for Outside Counsel (Guideline A.3), in 1 Company
Pol’y Statements (Bus. Laws, Inc.) 754-55 (June 1992).
73. Overnite Transp. Co., Outside Counsel Guidelines (June 1993), in 1 Outside
Counsel Management (Am. Corp. Counsel Ass’n) 339 (1994).

2001]

TRIPARTITE RELATIONSHIP

871

As these excerpts illustrate, entities value consistency for several
different, but equally valid, reasons.
First, a consistent philosophy and set of rules allow purchasers of
legal services to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of the law
firms they hire. Commonly, corporations and insurers litigate the
same matters in multiple jurisdictions over and over again. In order
to adequately represent their interests (and, in the case of insurers,
the interests of their insureds as well), they must engage tens or
sometimes hundreds of firms. Applying the same benchmarks to all
their firms permits them to fairly judge the firms’ work product and
relative costs, and to select and reward those firms whose expertise
and efficiency are most closely aligned with their goals.
Second, a lack of consistency in legal representation can create
extraordinary liability and legal fee exposures. Without a corporate
litigation policy and the means of implementing it, decisionmaking is
erratic and subject to the biases of the individual litigation manager
and attorney. Inconsistent decisions can lead to unnecessary
countersuits, ruined relationships with business partners and
customers, and discovery of documents and deposition testimony that
can be used adversely in subsequent litigation. As one commentator
noted:
It is vital that a corporate defendant set its goals and priorities
for handling its significant litigation. Cases should not be
considered “inventory” and ignored once they are put on the shelf
with an outside trial counsel. Product integrity issues resolved in
litigation conducted without strong and capable company
stewardship may result, through inattention, in the termination of
some company’s product lines.74

Third, a lack of consistency needlessly wastes money.
Corporations and insurers oversee huge volumes of litigation, which
translates into knowledge of what works and what does not work.
These clients quickly amass storehouses of information and research
that aid and guide litigation, eliminating duplicative work and futile
efforts. Finally, litigation guidelines also benefit the attorneys
engaged by these businesses, public entities, and carriers. By clearly
communicating expectations up front to the attorney, guidelines
provide attorneys with a roadmap of sorts and ensure future
business so important to the growth and stability of the firm.75
74. Edward Lowenberg, Consolidated Defense Experience: Working with CoDefendants to Really Minimize Costs, in FIFTH ANNUAL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT
SUPERCOURSE 75, 78 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5184,
1994) (discussing the concept of shared outside counsel litigation guidelines in the context
of a joint defense arrangement), WESTLAW, 497 PLI/Lit 75.
75. Notably, litigation guidelines are routine for shared outside counsel in joint
defense situations. See Lowenberg, supra note 74, at 96.
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2. Auditing
Like litigation management guidelines, auditing legal bills serves
the interests and obligations of all parties in the tripartite
relationship. The audit process improves the quality of legal
representation by allowing the insurer to monitor the defense
attorney’s performance and thus ensure that the attorney is
advancing the litigation goals identified at the outset of the
representation. In addition, the audit process allows the insurer to
ensure that the insurer and insured are receiving an effective
defense, based on reasonable fees, which, in turn, keeps future
premiums at the lowest possible level.
Audit services are best performed by a person or entity with
experience reviewing attorney billing statements. A client may lack
the expertise or internal resources to audit the charges effectively. In
these situations, a client should be entitled to consult with outside
service vendors, in much the same way that an insurer is entitled to
retain an accountant to help it adjust the business interruption on a
fire loss. Indeed, corporate law departments, public entities, and selfinsured businesses routinely engage outside auditors to analyze
billings of their retained law firms.76 In fact, the Florida Supreme
Court has actually required the use of third-party auditors in certain
disciplinary actions.77
B. These Practices Do Not Violate Ethics Rules or
Endanger Privileges
The insured’s contractual duty to cooperate, in concert with the
insurer’s defense obligations, requires disclosures to the insurer that
are reasonable or necessary to the defense of a claim.78 Further, as
recognized above, counsel representing more than one client in the
same matter generally are permitted to share information gleaned
from the representation among all clients.79 Certainly, “[s]haring of
information among the co-clients with respect to the matter involved
in the representation is normal and typically expected.”80 In
summary, defense counsel’s disclosure of information to justify fees
facilitates the defense of a claim and serves the mutual interest of
the insurer and insured in obtaining quality legal representation at
the lowest possible cost.
76. See Syverud, supra note 14, at 183.
77. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Valladares, 698 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla. 1997) (requiring an
attorney, as a condition of probation, to employ an accountant to render reports on his
operating and trust accounts).
78. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Allstate Ins. Co., 653 So. 2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1995).
79. See supra Part II.B.1.
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 cmt. l (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
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Nor does disclosure of legal bills to a third-party auditor endanger
the attorney-client privilege. In Florida, section 90.502, Florida
Statutes,81 governs the attorney-client privilege. Under that statute,
a communication between an attorney and client is “’confidential’ if it
is not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than: 1. Those to
whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of legal services to
the client.”82 Thus, “the attorney-client privilege ‘extends to the
necessary intermediaries and agents through whom such
communications are made.’”83 Similarly, protected work product loses
its protection only if disclosed to someone likely to pass it on to an
adversary of the client.84 Accordingly, disclosure of the basis for an
attorney’s billing statement to an insurer does not violate ethical
duties of confidentiality and does not lead to the waiver of privileges.
These conclusions are not altered because an outside auditing
firm reviews the billing statements.85 This is rooted in the protection
granted to disclosures made to outside contractors in furtherance of
litigation.86 These independent contractors may include expert
witnesses, expert consultants, computer database companies,
accounting firms, data processing and storage firms, printing firms,
photocopying firms, paper disposal firms, or anyone else “further[ing]
. . . the rendition of legal services to the client.”87 Absent client
consent for disclosure, these independent contractors have a duty to
maintain the confidentiality of the information provided to them by
the attorney.88 The confidential information is being disclosed to
further the defense of the insured, and the insured is in no way
exposed to a waiver of privilege.89 Likewise, if an individual is acting
as an agent for the client, then the communication is confidential.90
Moreover, the defense attorney is not precluded by any ethical
obligation from sharing that information with the independent
contractor.91 It would defy common sense, for example, to assert that
81. FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (2000).
82. Id. § 90.502(1)(c)(1) (emphasis added).
83. Gerheiser v. Stephens, 712 So. 2d 1252, 1254-55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (quoting
State v. Kociolek, 129 A.2d 417, 424 (N.J. 1957), and City of San Francisco v. Superior
Court, 231 P.2d 26, 31 (Cal. 1951) (en banc)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 cmt. l (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (confidential
information of co-clients); id. § 120 cmt. f (attorney-client privilege).
84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 140(4) & cmt. b
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
85. See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 639 So. 2d 6, 10 (Fla. 1994).
86. See id.
87. FLA. STAT. § 90.502(1)(c)(1) (2000).
88. See § 90.502(2).
89. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 cmt. g
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (attorney-client privilege).
90. See Gerheiser v. Stephens, 712 So. 2d 1252, 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
91. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 cmt. f
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
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an attorney is prohibited—either ethically or legally—from sending
information that needs to be copied to an outside photocopying
vendor, or that a client’s permission need be obtained beforehand. A
defense attorney “may disclose confidential client information for the
purpose of facilitating the lawyer’s law practice, where no reasonable
prospect of harm to the client is thereby created and where
appropriate safeguards against impermissible use or disclosure are
taken.”92 Indeed, attorneys need not obtain client consent before
sending detailed time-sheet information to a data processing firm for
bookkeeping purposes.93
This idea is consistent with ethics rules generally, including the
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.94 As indicated above, in defending
a claim an insurer has explicit authority from the insured (the coclient) to control the case.95 As such, the insurer as co-client and as
the ceded agent for the insured has the authority to disclose
information to agents acting on behalf of the insurer, such as
auditors.96
Bill auditing by an insurer is as much a part of the litigation
process as the functions performed by a defense attorney or a
retained outside contractor. In these instances, the work being done
is fundamental to the litigation process; it matters not whether the
work is performed by the defense attorney, the insurer’s employees,
or by outside contractors. All of these persons and entities are acting
in furtherance of the insured’s defense. There is simply no adversity
of interest or other problem of disclosure that would undercut
available privileges or lead to the breach of policyholder
confidences.97
Moreover, ethics rules universally prohibit attorneys from
charging excessive fees.98 The extensive list of factors to be
Formal Op. 398 (1995) (recognizing that attorneys use outside contractors, and that they
may do so as long as they “make reasonable efforts to ensure that the company has in
place, or will establish, reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality of client
information”).
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 cmt. g (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996); see also, e.g., R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6, http://www.flabar.
org/lawpractice/Rules/rrtfbch4.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
93. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1364
(1976); see also, e.g., R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6.
94. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6 cmt.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
96. See Gerheiser v. Stephens, 712 So. 2d 1252, 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (extending
attorney-client privilege to necessary intermediaries and agents through whom such
communications are made).
97. The Montana Supreme Court recently concluded that the release of information to
a third-party auditor requires specific consent of the insured. See In re Rules of Prof’l
Conduct and Insurer Imposed Billing Rules and Procedures, 2 P.3d 806, 821 (Mont. 2000).
As discussed below in Part IV.B, this conclusion is simply unreasonable and unwise.
98. For example, The Florida Bar forbids its members from charging or collecting an
“illegal, prohibited, or clearly excessive fee.” R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.5(a).
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considered when determining the reasonableness of legal fees99 is
clear evidence that fees were meant to be examined as part of the
litigation process. Auditing is simply a mechanism by which one
client (the one paying the defense bills) is able to verify its obligation
to pay for legal services. It is both unrealistic and unlawful for an
attorney to demand that attorneys’ fees be paid without fully
justifying the fees. This is simply a matter of attorney accountability.
In summary, an attorney does not violate any ethical rules of
confidentiality when that attorney shares information with the
carrier or a third-party auditor retained by the carrier to further the
representation. To claim otherwise would be to state that the
attorney ethics rules could be used to erode any existing contractual
obligations the attorney might have or could be used to diminish the
bargaining position of all purchasers of legal services. In addition, if
the submission of billing statements to an outside auditor were
unethical or waived evidentiary privileges, it would be impossible to
resolve billing disputes among the insurer, insured, and defense
attorney. Indeed, courts routinely employ outside auditors to
determine the amount of legal fees to be awarded. No attorney has
the right to demand a fee from an insurer or any other client without
providing reasonable justification for that fee.
IV. ADVISORY OPINIONS LIMITING LITIGATION
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
Permitting an attorney to cancel or avoid bargained-for
litigation management guidelines would be crippling to businesses
trying to compete effectively in the marketplace while facing a
mounting onslaught of lawsuits. However, under the guise of
“ethical considerations” one state court100 and at least thirty-two
bar associations have issued opinions attempting to do just that.101
Analysis of these opinions reveals that they are typified by a
number of analytical flaws. Among the most significant are
issuing opinions in a factual vacuum,102 misapplying existing case
law,103 failing to recognize the insurer’s status as a co-client (or, at

99. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.5(b).
100. See In re Rules of Prof’l Conduct, 2 P.2d 806.
101. See infra Appendix B.
102. See, e.g., Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 99-1 (1999); Haw. Sup. Ct.
Disciplinary Bd., Formal Ops. 36, 37 (1999); Ind. State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op.
4 (1998); Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op. 99-01 (1999); Or. State Bar
Ass’n, Formal Op. 1999-157 (1999); Wis. State Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. E-99-1
(1999) (absence of specific hypothetical facts).
103. See Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm’n, Formal Op. RO-98-02 (1998)
(misconstruing United States v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 129 F.3d 681 (1st
Cir. 1997)); Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 91 (1993) (same); Ind. State Bar
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a bare minimum, as an agent of the insured),104 and erroneously
interpreting ethics rules.105 These are all exacerbated by a tendency
of the opinions to cite to one another as authority without
investigating whether the underlying laws of the states are the same
or whether the cited opinion actually conforms to the law of its own
state.106 Further, many rely on out-of-state opinions that were
ultimately invalidated.107
A. State Ethics Opinions108
1. Contradictions with Substantive Law
One of the most common failings of state ethics opinions in this
area is intruding into areas of substantive law. Not only are issues of
contract law, for example, outside the jurisdiction of bar staff, but
bar staff have shown a dangerous tendency to get it wrong. A pointed
illustration is provided by Florida Bar Staff Opinions 20,591109 and

Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 3 (1998) (same); Miss. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 211 (1993)
(same); R.I. Sup. Ct. Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 99-18 (1999) (same).
104. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 716 (1999) (asserting that
only the insured is the client); Me. Prof. Ethics Comm’n of the Bd. of Overseers of the Bar,
Op. 164 (1998) (same); S.D. State Bar, Ethics Op. 99-2 (1999) (same); Tenn. Sup. Ct. Bd. of
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 99-F-143 (1999) (same); Vt. Prof’l Responsibility
Comm., Advisory Ethics Op. 98-7 (1998) (same); Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 195
(1999) (same); see also Mo. Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Informal Advisory Op.
No. 980,188 (1998) (referring to insured as “the client”); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm.,
Op. 98-36 (1998) (same); W. Va. State Bar Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., Legal Ethics Op. 99-02
(1999) (describing insured as “the primary client”).
105. See, e.g., Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 107 (1999) (failing to
appreciate the distinction between independent judgment and independent action); Idaho
State Bar Ass’n Board of Comm’rs, Formal Ethics Op. 136 (1999) (same); Md. State Bar
Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Ethics Docket 99-7 (1999) (requiring express consent of insured
before disclosing information to third-party auditor).
106. See, e.g., Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 107 (1999).
107. See Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm’n, Formal Op. RO-98-02 (1998); Colo. Bar
Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 107 (1999); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 290 (1999);
Md. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Ethics Docket 99-7 (1999); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Ethics Inquiry 98-99-02 (1998); Pa. Bar Ass’n
Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 98-32 (1998); Tenn. Sup. Ct.
Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 99-F-143 (1999); Vt. Prof’l Responsibility
Comm., Advisory Ethics Op. 98-7 (1998); Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1723
(1998); W. Va. State Bar Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., Legal Ethics Op. 99-02 (1999).
108. After this Article was drafted but before publication, the Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association issued Formal
Opinion 01-421, Ethical Obligations of a Lawyer Working Under Company Guidelines and
Other Restrictions, Feb. 16, 2001. While the authors have some reservations as to the
wording of the conclusions reached in the opinion, the authors believe the opinion contains
(contrary to most state bar association opinions) a thorough factual presentation; excellent,
comprehensive research; thoughtful and balanced analysis of competing issues; and most
importantly, sound guidance for attorneys founded upon practical realities.
109. Fla. Bar Staff, Op. 20,591 (1997) (on file with The Fla. Bar), available at
http://www.dri.org/research/opinions/op6.html.
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20,762110 and three successor proposed advisory opinions (the
“PAOs”)111 which were ultimately rejected by Florida’s Board of
Governors.112
Both staff opinions, which underwent no formal review, contain
the erroneous, extra-jurisdictional statement that “an insurance
defense lawyer’s client is the insured, not the insurance company.”113
The question of who is a client, however, is an issue of contract
law.114 Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court, in In re Proposed Addition
to the Additional Rules Governing Conduct of Attorneys in
Florida115—issued before the staff opinions—recognized that a
Florida defense attorney may represent both the insurer and the
insured.116 In fact, The Florida Bar’s Ethics Committee ultimately
deleted that statement from the PAOs.117
Yet even the PAOs continued to analyze the issues as if the
insurance company were nothing more than a third-party payor for
legal services and as if a defense attorney cannot represent the
interests of both an insured and his or her insurance company as coclients.118 The PAOs also wrongly denied the authority of the insurer
to settle cases, despite statutory and contract law to the contrary.119
This type of assertion is an obvious source of confusion to defense
counsel.
Furthermore, by paying inadequate attention to relevant contract
law, the opinions risked causing insureds to forfeit the insurer’s duty
to defend. By requiring the attorney not only to inform the insured
regarding the attorney’s employment relationship with the insurer,

110. Fla. Bar Staff, Op. 20,762 (1998) (on file with The Fla. Bar), available at
http://www.dri.org/research/opinions/op5.html.
111. See Fla. Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Proposed Advisory Op. 99-4 (1999), http://www.
flabar.org/newflabar/images/downloads/99-04pao.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2000); Fla. Bar
Prof’l Ethics Comm., Proposed Advisory Op. 99-3 (1999), http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/
images/downloads/99-03pao.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2000); Fla. Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm.,
Proposed Advisory Op. 99-2, http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/images/downloads/9902pao.pdf (1999) (last visited Nov. 15, 2000).
112. See Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar
(Dec. 15, 2000), http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/organization/Board/dec00min.html.
113. Fla. Bar Staff, Op. 20,591 (1997); Fla. Bar Staff, Op. 20,762 (1998).
114. See supra Part II.A.2.
115. 220 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1969).
116. Id. at 8; see also supra Part II.A.2.
117. See sources cited supra note 111.
118. Compare Fla. Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Proposed Advisory Op. 99-3,
http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/images/downloads/99-03pao.pdf (last visited Nov. 15,
2000), with In re Proposed Addition to the Additional Rules, 220 So. 2d at 8. See also
IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 19 (the Statement).
119. Compare Fla. Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Proposed Advisory Op. 99-3,
http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/images/downloads/99-03pao.pdf (last visited Nov. 15,
2000), with Shuster v. South Broward Hosp. Dist. Physicians’ Prof’l Liab. Ins. Trust, 591
So. 2d 174, 176 (Fla. 1992). See also IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 19 (the Statement).
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but also to obtain the consent of the insured,120 they erroneously
implied that an insured may decline representation by a staff
attorney. This completely ignores the consequences such an action
can have under contract law: that is, the insured would possibly
nullify the insurer’s duty to defend by declining such representation.
2. Misinterpretations of the Ethics Rules
a. Erroneous Interpretations of the Confidentiality Rules.—The
Florida opinions are again typical in misinterpreting the ethics rules.
For example, PAO 99-2 would have prohibited the release of all
confidential information to all third parties without first obtaining
permission from the insured.121 Yet, such an interpretation can be
reached only by ignoring the exceptions to the nondisclosure
provisions discussed in Part II above. In view of those exceptions, the
restrictions imposed by the opinions are simply unwarranted.
b. Confusing Independent Judgment with Independent Action.—
Many opinions also confuse independence of judgment with freedom
to carry out that judgment without regard to the client’s wishes.122
For instance, the Florida PAOs sought to prohibit the use of certain
litigation management guidelines based on the erroneous conclusion
that such guidelines adversely affect an attorney’s independent
professional judgment.123 Examination of Florida’s ethics rules
illustrates this error. For example, Rule 4-1.2 of the Rules Regulating
The Florida Bar states, in pertinent part, that “[a] lawyer shall abide
by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . .
and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to
be pursued.”124 Furthermore, as the comments to the rule provide:
The client has ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be
served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law
and the lawyer’s professional obligations. Within those limits, a
client also has a right to consult with the lawyer about the means to
be used in pursuing those objectives. . . . A clear distinction
between objectives and means sometimes cannot be drawn, and in
120. Compare Fla. Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Proposed Advisory Op. 99-4,
http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/images/downloads/99-04pao.pdf (last visited Nov. 15,
2000), with In re Proposed Addition to the Additional Rules, 220 So. 2d at 8. See also
IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 18-19 (the Statement).
121. Compare Fla. Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Proposed Advisory Op. 99-2,
http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/images/downloads/99-02pao.pdf (last visited Nov. 15,
2000), with R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6 cmt., http://www.flabar.org/lawpractice/Rules/
rrtfbch4.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2001); see also IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 19 (the
Statement).
122. See, e.g., Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm’n, Formal Op. RO-98-02 (1998).
123. See Fla. Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Proposed Advisory Op. 99-3 (1999), http://www.
flabar.org/newflabar/images/downloads/99-03pao.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2000).
124. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.2(a), http://www.flabar.org/lawpractice/Rules/
rrtfbch4.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
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many cases the client-lawyer relationship partakes of a joint
undertaking. In questions of means, the lawyer should assume
responsibility for technical and legal tactical issues but should
defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be
incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely
affected.125

Thus, under Rule 4-1.2, the attorney is responsible for the technical
and legal tactical issues while the client controls the means to be
used in pursuing those objectives.126 For instance, an attorney cannot
file a specific action without the client’s consent.127 Likewise, a client
is typically able to control whether depositions and research should
be conducted based on whether the client wishes to incur fees for
such expenses.128 Because the insured has ceded the right to control
litigation to the insurer, it is the insurer, as co-client, that controls
the litigation and the accrual of accompanying fees.129
Attorneys clearly must be free to exercise their independent
professional judgment by forming and voicing their opinions if they
are to provide the best possible advice to their clients (independent
judgment). On the other hand, clients, not attorneys, have the right to
decide which advice to accept and which attorney action to authorize
(independent action).130 If attorneys are unimpeded by their clients’
wishes during the course of the representation, clients are effectively
held hostage by their own counsel. Absent a material and
irreconciliable conflict with the insured, to deny insurers the right to
direct their insureds’ litigation is to negate the right of all clients to
decide the conduct of their cases. As stated in the preamble to the
Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, a “lawyer is a representative
of clients . . . [and] as a representative of clients, a lawyer performs
various functions.”131 These include acting as adviser, advocate,
negotiator, and intermediary.132 These valuable functions all require
the exercise of independent professional judgment, but independence
of judgment should not be confused with ultimate decisionmaking
responsibility, which is the prerogative of the client.

125. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.2 cmt. (emphasis added).
126. See id.
127. See Florida Bar v. Hayden, 583 So. 2d 1016, 1017 (Fla. 1991).
128. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.2 cmt.
129. As noted earlier, if the insurer’s decisions regarding fees are not made in good
faith, the insured has a remedy in an action for bad faith. See supra text accompanying
note 19.
130. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.2 cmt.
131. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR preamble to ch. 4.
132. See id.
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3. The Imagined Threat to Attorney-Client Privilege
Several opinions cite to United States v. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology133 for the proposition that the disclosure of information by
an insurer or attorney to a third-party auditor waives the attorneyclient privilege and thus may be detrimental to the insured.134 This is
simply untrue. As noted above, under the common interest doctrine,
information may be shared among co-clients and their agents acting
pursuant to confidentiality agreements.135
Furthermore, the MIT opinion does nothing to undermine that
black letter law. The actual facts of that case (which are not readily
apparent from reading the opinion itself) reflect that the information
disclosed in that case was disclosed to the opposing party,136 and not
to a party that falls within the scope of the common-interest doctrine
or to a party necessary to properly effect the representation.137 Thus,
it is inappropriate to rely on this case for the proposition that the use
of third-party auditors poses a threat to the insured.
4. Issuance Without a Formal Process
Moreover, complicating these errors, most ethics opinions are
issued without any court approval process, or other approval process,
for allowing the contents of the ethics opinions to be contested.138
Again, Florida Staff Opinions 20,591 and 20,762 offer a good
example. Both of these opinions were prepared by Florida Bar ethics
staff without any formal approval process. After these staff opinions
were issued, formal advisory opinions (the PAOs) addressing the
same issues and containing much of the same language were
proposed and ultimately contested before The Florida Bar’s Board of
Governors.139

133. 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997).
134. See Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm’n, Formal Op. RO-98-02 (1998); Alaska Bar
Ass’n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 99-1 (1999); Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op.
107 (1999); Ind. State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 4 (1998); Ky. Bar Ass’n, Advisory
Ethics Op. E-404 (1998); Miss. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 246 (1999); Or. State Bar Ass’n,
Formal Op. 1999-157 (1999); R.I. Sup. Ct. Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 99-17 (1999).
135. See supra text accompanying note 42.
136. See MIT, 129 F.3d at 681-82 (stating that MIT had previously disclosed the
information to an auditing agency of the Department of Defense, but then asserted
privilege as to the IRS).
137. See Fla. Bar Ins. Practices Special Study Comm., transcript of public hearing at
113-14 (Nov. 4, 1999) (available at The Fla. Bar, Tallahassee, Fla.) (statement of Bill
Barker).
138. See, e.g., FLA. BAR PROCEDURES FOR RULING ON QUESTIONS OF ETHICS Rule 2(c),
http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/memberservices/ethics/ethrules.html (last visited Oct. 29,
2000).
139. See sources cited supra note 111.
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As the AIA and other insurers argued,140 the PAOs were outside
the jurisdiction of the Professional Ethics Committee, in part because
they attempted to establish broad policy tantamount to rules
governing bar member’s conduct—without the benefit of a
particularized set of facts regarding specific, contemplated conduct of
a member of the Bar.141 This, in turn, led to substantive errors in the
PAOs. On December 15, 2000, the Board of Governors unanimously
rejected the PAOs because of “concerns regarding the procedures
under which the opinions were promulgated.”142
Further, state ethics opinions are often drafted by bar staff
attorneys143 who are unlikely to have much experience with
evaluating ethics in the specific context of insurance defense. Most
likely, the failure to provide adequate process is a result of the
“advisory” nature of almost all state bar ethics opinions. However,
even if such opinions cannot be used to bring a disciplinary action
against an attorney, they are nonetheless official pronouncements of,
if not the Bar, the very counsel that may be charged with bringing
disciplinary actions against attorneys. Thus, many ethics opinions
have the potential to constitute essentially new ethics rules, to the
extent that they represent broad policy decisions by individuals with
the powers of prosecutorial discretion. It is therefore unsettling for
these types of issues to be resolved without any proper rulemaking
process.
5. Reliance on Opinions of Other States
At least eighteen state bar ethics opinions cite to, rely on, or claim
to be consistent with, ethics opinions of other states.144 However, in
140. See Fla. Bar Board Review Committee on Professional Ethics, transcript of
hearing at 6-25 (Dec. 14, 2000) (on file with authors) (statements of Stephen Grimes and
Steve Day).
141. The Florida Bar’s procedures provides that members of The Florida Bar may
request an advisory opinion from Bar Staff and then from the Committee “about their
contemplated professional conduct . . . .” FLA. BAR PROCEDURES FOR RULING ON QUESTIONS
OF ETHICS Rule 2(a), http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/memberservices/ethics/ethrules.html
(last visited Oct. 29, 2000) (emphasis added). In fact, Rule 2(b) specifically provides that
“[e]ach request shall present in detail all operative facts upon which the request is based,
including a statement affirming that the inquiring member is requesting an advisory
ethics opinion concerning the member’s own contemplated conduct.” Rule 2(b).
142. Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar
(Dec. 15, 2000), http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/organization/Board/dec00min.html.
143. See FLA. BAR PROCEDURES FOR RULING ON QUESTIONS OF ETHICS Rule 2(c).
144. See Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm’n, Formal Op. RO-98-02 (1998); Colo. Bar
Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 91 (1993); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 290 (1999);
Idaho State Bar Ass’n Bd. of Comm’rs, Formal Ethics Op. 136 (1999); Ill. State Bar Ass’n,
Advisory Op. on Prof’l Conduct 98-08 (1999); Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct,
Op. 99-01 (1999); Ky. Bar Ass’n, Advisory Ethics Op. E-404 (1998); Md. State Bar Ass’n
Comm. on Ethics, Ethics Docket 99-7 (2000); Miss. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 246 (1993); N.Y.
State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 716 (1999); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Ethics and
Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Ethics Inquiry 98-99-02 (1998); Or. State Bar Ass’n, Formal
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making that claim, those ethics opinions do not analyze the cited
states’ substantive law to determine whether the law in those states
is consistent with the law of the state in which the opinion is
issued.145 Further, some have cited to opinions that either
contradicted their own states’ case law or were subsequently
withdrawn or overruled.
A pointed illustration is the reliance of other states, such as
Vermont, on Florida Staff Opinions 20,591 and 20,762. At least
eleven states cite to Florida Bar Staff Opinions 20,591 or 20,762 for
support,146 despite the substantive and procedural flaws outlined
above. In fact, the statement that “an insurance defense lawyer’s
client is the insured, not the insurance company,” was repeated
verbatim in Vermont Professional Responsibility Committee,
Advisory Ethics Opinion 98-7, which cites to Florida Bar Staff
Opinion 20,762 for support.147 Yet, as noted above, this statement
contradicted Florida’s substantive law. In fact, it appears to
contradict Vermont’s substantive law as well.148
In short, by relying on unapproved, legally incorrect Florida staff
opinions, Vermont and other states have perpetuated ethics opinions
that are based in large part on erroneous conclusions and
supposition. Because of the potential for error, no foreign opinion
should ever be used as the basis for an ethics opinion unless: (1) the
foreign opinion was issued based on a proper process; (2) the foreign
opinion is first compared with the underlying law of that state’s
jurisdiction (including substantive law regarding the formation of
attorney-client relationships and the law of insurance); (3) the law of
the foreign jurisdiction is then compared with the law of the issuing
state; and (4) the underlying facts of the foreign opinion provide an
Op. 1999-157 (1999); Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility,
Informal Op. 98-32 (1998); R.I. Sup. Ct. Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 99-18 (1999); Tenn.
Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 99-F-143 (1999); Vt. Prof’l
Responsibility Comm., Advisory Ethics Op. 98-7 (1998); Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal
Ethics, Op. 1723 (1998); W. Va. State Bar Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., Legal Ethics Op. 99-02
(1999).
145. See, e.g., Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 107 (1999).
146. See Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm’n, Formal Op. RO-98-02 (1998); Colo. Bar
Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 107 (1999); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 290 (1999);
Md. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Ethics Docket 99-7 (1999); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Ethics Inquiry 98-99-02 (1998); Pa. Bar Ass’n
Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 98-32 (1998); Tenn. Sup. Ct.
Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 99-F-143 (1999); Vt. Prof’l Responsibility
Comm., Advisory Ethics Op. 98-7 (1998); Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1723
(1998); W. Va. State Bar Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., Legal Ethics Op. 99-02 (1999).
147. Vt. Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Advisory Ethics Op. 98-7 (1998).
148. See In re Illuzi, 632 A.2d 346, 355 (Vt. 1993) (finding that the plaintiff’s attorney
violated ethics rules by speaking directly to the insurer instead of communicating through
the attorney hired to defend the insurer). The dissenting opinion in Illuzzi disagreed only
as to the sanction and affirmed that at the beginning of the litigation, the attorney may
represent both the insured and the insurer. See id. at 492 (Allen, C.J., dissenting).
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adequate basis for applying the state’s ethics rules in the proper legal
context.
B. The Montana Decision
Even in the one opinion where a state supreme court has actually
addressed the use of third-party auditors and billing guidelines, the
legal analysis is illogical and fundamentally flawed. In In re Rules of
Professional Conduct and Insurer Imposed Billing Rules and
Procedures,149 the Montana Supreme Court concluded that billing
guidelines per se interfere with the independent judgment of defense
counsel150 and that defense counsel cannot disclose billing
information to third-party auditors without first obtaining the
insured’s contemporaneous and fully informed consent.151 The court
based its decision on a number of irrational factors and conclusions.
The court: (1) concluded that under ethics rules, the insurer is not a
co-client of defense counsel, while upholding prior Montana decisions
holding just the opposite;152 (2) concluded that those prior Montana
decisions finding that the insurer and insured were co-clients of
defense counsel were inapposite because they did not address the
relationship under the Rules of Professional Conduct;153 (3) defined
independence of professional judgment as freedom of independent
action;154 (4) treated mere potential conflicts of interest as actual
conflicts of interest;155 and (5) treated the disclosure of detailed
billing statements to a third-party auditor as disclosure to a potential
adversary.156 Each of these conclusions is flawed.
First, as explained above, client status is not afforded by the Rules
of Professional Conduct.157 Rather, it is a function of the substantive
contract law of the state.158 Ethics rules address attorney obligations
and behavior toward clients and nonclients alike.159 Clearly, those
obligations will differ depending on whether an affected person is a
client, a represented party, a witness, an officer of the court, or even
a stranger to the proceeding. But the rules do not determine the

149. 2 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2000).
150. Id. at 815.
151. Id. at 821-22.
152. See id. at 810-14.
153. See id. at 810.
154. See id. at 817.
155. See id. at 814.
156. See id. at 821.
157. See supra Part II.A.2.
158. See supra Part II.A.2.
159. See, e.g., R. REGULATING FLA. BAR preamble to ch. 4, http://www.flabar.org/
lawpractice/Rules/rrtfbch4.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
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affected person’s status; they merely set forth the obligations
accompanying the person’s status.160
Second, the Montana Supreme Court’s rationales for assigning
client status for purposes of substantive law and withholding it for
purposes of ethics law reveal a glaring inconsistency. If the total
control afforded by the insurance contract suffices to make insurers
liable for the conduct of defense counsel and suffices to make
insurers “clients” within the scope of the attorney-client privilege,
then it does not logically follow that an insurer cannot exercise the
control afforded by the insurance contract because no attorney is
permitted to follow its instructions under ethics rules. It is an empty
gesture to note that Montana case law permits the insurer to control
the defense of covered claims but to nonetheless conclude, using a
tortured interpretation of ethics rules, that the insurer cannot
exercise that control. Arguably, the Montana Supreme Court’s
decision that contractual control must give way to the ethics rules
would undermine the law of bad faith in Montana.
Third, as noted above, equating freedom of action with
independence of judgment is erroneous because it would allow an
attorney’s advisory role to expropriate actual decisionmaking
authority typically reserved to the client or its agents.161 As the
United States Supreme Court determined in Evans v. Jeff D.,162
attorneys must be free to offer candid advice and to recommend a
course of action to those who retain them.163 However, the choice to
act or refrain from acting on the attorney’s advice must always be a
separate decision for the client, or its assignee or agent, to make.164
Despite this fact, the Montana court concluded that billing and
practice rules violate the Rules of Professional Conduct by interfering
with defense counsels’ freedom of action.165
The ethics rules require attorneys to ensure they retain the
freedom to give advice,166 but they limit what action attorneys can
take in the context of the clients’ decisionmaking authority.167 To the
extent that the insured-client has ceded that decisionmaking
160. Under the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (after which both Florida’s
and Montana’s rules were modeled), Rules 4.1 through 4.4 all relate to the attorney’s
behavior toward nonclients, see, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.3
(1998) (regarding dealings with unrepresented persons), while Rules 1.1 through 1.17
detail obligations toward clients, see, e.g., Rule 1.4 (regarding communicating with a
client).
161. See supra Part IV.A.2.b.
162. 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
163. Id. at 728.
164. See, e.g., R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.2 cmt.
165. See In re Rules of Prof’l Conduct and Insurer Imposed Billing Rules and
Procedures, 2 P.3d 806, 815 (Mont. 2000).
166. See, e.g., R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.7(b).
167. See, e.g., R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.2 cmt.
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authority to another, the attorney’s right to act is still limited. The
Montana court’s statements seem to imply that the threat of
withholding payment always acts to chill an attorney’s independent
professional judgment168 (because, for example, the attorney does not
want to risk harm to a future stream of business). This is nonsense
because the same would be true in any situation where an attorney
gets most of his or her business from a few large clients. At bottom,
any issue of payment is a matter between the attorney and the client,
not a matter to be resolved in the name of ethics.
Fourth, the court fails to appreciate the critical difference between
merely potential and actual conflicts of interest. The court notes that
“[b]efore the final resolution of any claim against an insured, there
clearly exists the potential for conflicts of interest to arise.”169 This,
however, is true in every situation involving multiple clients or an
agency relationship. At this level of abstraction, virtually no legal
relationship is immune to a potential conflict of interest.
However, the ethics rules (and supporting case law) deal with
actualities, not mere potentialities. The Tennessee Supreme Court in
In re Youngblood,170 a case ironically cited with approval by the
Montana Supreme Court in its decision,171 specifically based its
holding on a rejection of potential conflict as a basis for overturning
an ethical opinion adverse to insurers.172 The Tennessee court stated
that “[b]ecause the opinion bases its finding upon the potential for
conflict in the relationship of employer-employee rather than
particular facts which demonstrate there is, in fact, a conflict of
interest, it does not reflect a proper interpretation of the Code [of
Professional Conduct].”173 Tellingly, the three examples of potential
conflict used by the Montana court174 are all examples of actual
conflict and would fall outside the community of interests upon
which the insurers rely when giving directions to defense attorneys.
In none of these cases would litigation guidelines even be in use.
Finally, the Montana court erroneously assumes that cost control
measures are, by their nature, “adversarial.”175 This cannot be true.
Otherwise, insurers would not be able to audit an attorney’s bills
internally. More importantly, no payor for legal services (whether
client or not) would be able to scrutinize the attorney’s bills without
running the risk of creating an adversarial relationship.

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See In re Rules of Prof’l Conduct, 2 P.3d at 815.
Id. at 814.
895 S.W.2d 322 (Tenn. 1995).
See In re Rules of Prof’l Conduct, 2 P.3d at 815.
See In re Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d at 330.
Id. (emphasis added).
See In re Rules of Pro’fl Conduct, 2 P.3d at 813.
Id. at 821.
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V. INSURANCE PRACTICES SPECIAL STUDY COMMITTEE AND THE
STATEMENT OF INSURED CLIENT’S RIGHTS
In early 1999, The Florida Bar, like many other bar associations
throughout the country, was asked to address issues related to the
insurance tripartite relationship.176 The Bar examined these issues
through two separate committees working on parallel tracts: the
Professional Ethics Committee (“Ethics Committee”) and the
Insurance Practices Special Study Committee (“IPSSC”). The IPSSC
was created by the Bar’s leadership and was charged with:
protect[ing] the public and those insured by policies of insurance
issued in the State of Florida from the business practices of certain
insurance companies that may (1) constitute the unauthorized
practice of law by nonlawyer employees of the insurers; (2) give
rise to conflicts of interest or other violations of the Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar by defense counsel; (3) compromise the
quality of the defense provided to Florida insureds; or (4) fail to
adequately inform Florida insureds of the limitations and
restrictions imposed upon defense counsel by the insurers and the
ethical concerns that arise from those limitations and
restrictions.177

As noted above, the recommendations of the Ethics Committee were
ultimately rejected. The recommendations of the IPSSC, however,
were accepted.
A. Participatory Process Leads to Workable Solutions Consistent
with Substantive Law
The IPSSC was an appropriate body for examining factual issues
and making recommendations for the adoption of rules governing the
professional conduct of attorneys.178 To that end, the IPSSC engaged
in an exhaustive fact-finding process. The IPSSC held two full days
of public hearings, heard extensively from interested parties
representing conflicting positions on the issues before it, prepared
and received responses to surveys addressing these issues, and
collected volumes of information in this regard.179 The IPSSC also
allowed and welcomed interested parties to both comment and
participate at all of its more than eleven meetings (including full
committee and subcommittee meetings).180
176. This information is based on personal converstations between the authors and the
Board of Governor’s members.
177. IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
178. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 2-8.1, 2-8.2.
179. See IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-3, 6.
180. See id. at 6. In contrast, one of the authors attended the Ethics Committee’s last
two meetings in January and March 2000, which specifically prohibited any public
testimony regarding the PAOs. Additionally, the author attended the Committee’s three-
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At the conclusion of its work, the IPSSC issued a final report
making several recommendations to the Board of Governors of The
Florida Bar,181 the most significant of which was the proposal of the
Statement of Insured Client’s Rights182 (the Statement) and an
accompanying implementation rule governing distribution of the
Statement.183 The Statement was developed to facilitate an attorney’s
ethical responsibilities in insurance defense representation and to
assist insured clients in understanding their basic rights.184 Notably,
however, the IPSSC specifically noted in its comments to the
proposed rule that there was a potential for ethical risks any time an
attorney undertakes the representation of multiple clients.185
The work of the IPSSC also recognizes the import of the tripartite
relationship, the contractual obligations of both the insurer and the
insured, the highly variable nature of insurance, and the
impracticality of establishing a statement of rights or a rule
applicable to all forms of insurance.186 In fact, the comments to the
Statement specifically exclude workers’ compensation insurance from
its scope.187 Further, the IPSSC’s report acknowledges that, under
most policies, the insurer pays for and controls the defense.188
The Statement was designed to assist the attorney in explaining
to the insured how the representation will be handled.189 The
Statement does not prohibit guidelines or otherwise undermine the
provisions of the insurance contract.190 Rather, it advises the insured
that the insurer may impose guidelines, and that the attorney must
notify the insured if the attorney is denied authorization to provide a
service or action the attorney believes, in his or her independent
professional judgment, to be necessary.191 The Statement and
implementing rule reflect a recognition that: (1) the attorney may
have a duty to share confidential information with the insurer,192 (2)
insurers frequently have a contractual right to make the final
hour hearing on the original PAOs during which the Committee heard only limited
testimony.
181. See IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 13-29.
182. See id. at 17-22.
183. See id. at 17. The IPSSC also recommended the implementation of CLE courses
regarding the tripartite relationship, provided a copy of its record to the Florida
Department of Insurance for review, and suggested that The Florida Bar Unauthorized
Practice of Law Committee should review any issues regarding the unauthorized practice
of law since it was a more appropriate forum to address those issues. See id. at 23-27.
184. See id. at 2.
185. See id. at 20-21.
186. See id. at 13-16.
187. See id. at 21.
188. See id. at 18.
189. See id. at 16.
190. See id. at 18.
191. See id.
192. See id.
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decision regarding settlement of a claim,193 and (3) it is sometimes
impractical in the circumstances of insurance defense practice to
require a attorney to obtain an insured’s consent before taking
action.194 In essence, the Statement is consistent with and assists the
ethical obligations of an attorney by promoting a mutual
understanding of the attorney’s role in the particular representation
and providing an opportunity for insureds to communicate their
preferences to the lawyer; but it does not undermine existing law
governing the tripartite relationship and the insurance contract.
Further, the Statement is fully consistent with Florida ethics rules.195
This is the critical difference between the Statement and the
ethics opinions being issued by various state bar associations. The
chart in Appendix C illustrates these distinctions in more detail.196
The distinctions outlined in the appendix show that, as currently
framed, the IPSSC’s recommendations are sensible, realistic, and
grounded in practical application. In contrast, most ethics opinions
(as well as the Montana decision) are vague, unrealistic, and
unworkable.
B. Ethics Regulation and Economic Interests
The IPSSC heard extensive testimony regarding the important
distinction between illegitimate economic interference and legitimate
regulation of attorneys’ ethics.197 Many commentators correctly
asserted that attorney disgruntlement and complaints regarding
insurer litigation management practices—as well as the amount and
type of services for which an insurer will pay—are purely economic
issues affecting business relationships.198 That is, these practices
become ethics issues only if an insurer actually induces an attorney
to behave unethically.199
Obviously, attorneys must be able to offer candid advice and
recommend a course of action to those who retain them; this is what
is meant by exercising independence of judgment. As long as the
defense attorney is able to exercise independent judgment by
recommending a course of action to the insurer and the insured co193. See id. at 19.
194. See id. at 21.
195. In fact, the proposed rule specifically states, “Nothing in the Statement . . . shall
be deemed to augment or detract from any substantive or ethical duty of a lawyer . . . .” Id.
at 17.
196. See infra Appendix C.
197. See IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-7.
198. See, e.g., Fla. Bar Ins. Practices Special Study Comm., transcript of public hearing
at 146-47 (Nov. 19, 1999) (available at The Fla. Bar, Tallahassee, Fla.) (statement of
Charles Silver).
199. See, e.g., Fla. Bar Ins. Practices Special Study Comm., transcript of public hearing
at 129-30 (Nov. 4, 1999) (available at The Fla. Bar, Tallahassee, Fla.) (statement of Bill
Barker).
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clients and to actually perform the services needed to protect their
interests, the state bar associations have no jurisdiction to intervene
in the economic relationship between the defense attorney and the
insurer. Even though the IPSSC heard extensively from interested
parties on these issues, not a single case was presented to the IPSSC
in which an insured was actually harmed by third-party bill review,
litigation guidelines, or the use of staff counsel to carry out the
representation.200
Ethics opinions that single out one segment of the Bar to the
potential benefit of another segment or that artificially standardize
the cost of legal services raise serious questions of unfair
competition. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the
practice of law is both a profession and a business.201 Yet, the Court
has also recognized that “[t]he nature of an occupation, standing
alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act . . . .”202 As a
result, the Court has not hesitated to apply the antitrust laws to
those attorneys who have used the self-regulatory process or the
legal “profession” to shield anticompetitive business behavior.203 If a
court agrees that there is no evidentiary basis for finding that
insurers’ practices result in actual harm to insureds—or that a
committee
lacked
jurisdiction
to
issue
non-fact-specific
pronouncements that amount to surreptitious rulemaking—then
members of the public and others, including the courts, may conclude
that such ethics opinions are an illegal act motivated by economic
interest.
The interests of some attorneys in protecting their own incomes
are directly at odds with the interests of insurance consumers in
purchasing coverage at prices not inflated by unnecessary defense
costs. State bar associations ought not exploit ethics rules to advance
attorney interests over those of their insured clients. Clearly,
economic protectionism and competitive restraints are not legitimate
purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct or ethics opinions
interpreting those rules.
200. See, e.g., Fla. Bar Ins. Practices Special Study Comm., transcript of public hearing
at 1-265 (Nov. 4, 1999) (available at The Fla. Bar, Tallahassee, Fla.); Fla. Bar Ins.
Practices Special Study Comm., transcript of public hearing at 1-308 (Nov. 19, 1999)
(available at The Fla. Bar, Tallahassee, Fla.).
201. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975).
202. Id. at 787.
203. See id. at 791 (“The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited
purposes does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive
practices for the benefit of its members.”); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493
U.S. 411, 422-25 (1990) (holding that a boycott by a group of court-appointed criminal
attorneys aimed at increasing compensation for taking criminal cases of indigent
defendants constituted a per se violation of federal antitrust law); see also Hoover v.
Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 582-84 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (comparing occupational
restrictions to medieval guilds).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The various ethics opinions issued recently by state bar
associations, as well as the Montana decision, essentially seek to
impose a remedy where there is no problem. Absent an actual conflict
between an insurer and an insured, there are simply no existing
ethical dilemmas in need of solution by way of ethics or court
opinions. Indeed, the only dilemma is one of economics, which is
simply a contractual issue between the insurer and the defense
attorney. Further, these ethics opinions seemingly discriminate
against the insurance industry without a reasonable basis for the
distinction and frequently contradict clear legal precedent. In the
overwhelming majority of states, that precedent has unquestionably
sanctioned the insurance contract and the duties, responsibilities,
and rights established thereunder. Under that precedent, defense
counsel owes a duty to both the insurer and the insured, and the
insurer has an obligation to act in the best interests of the insured.204
Unlike the ethics opinions, the Statement of Insured Client’s
Rights acts to facilitate, not undermine, those obligations. The
authors believe that the Statement provides a great example to other
state bars of finding a responsible, balanced way to handle business
issues between attorneys and insurers in a way that aids insurance
consumers without jeopardizing the benefits they receive when they
buy liability insurance. This is a welcome change from the
misguided, closed processes which have produced opinions that
potentially damage the nature of liability insurance in those states.
All attorneys are bound by the rules regulating their professional
conduct. Moreover, the need for qualified attorneys with high ethical
standards is obviously essential. However, little or no evidence exists
that any ethics complaints relating to conflicts of interest have been
filed against attorneys acting within the insurance tripartite
relationship. Further, there is simply no evidence that the use of
outside auditing or litigation guidelines has harmed any insured (or
that there is no existing adequate remedy should such harm occur).
Rather, it is the ethics opinions themselves that will harm insureds
by undermining insurance contracts and causing an increase in
premiums based on the corresponding cost in unchecked attorneys
fees. Where insureds have not been harmed, it is simply
unconscionable to adopt ethics rules that will increase litigation costs
and premiums and single out the insurance industry without just
cause. The Statement of Insured Client’s Rights represents a viable,
alternative mechanism for promoting the ethical obligations of the
defense attorney in the tripartite relationship—without undermining
204. See, for example, the recent decision in Paradigm Ins. Co. v. The Longerman Law
Offices, P.A., 2001 Ariz. LEXS 87 (Ariz. 2001).
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existing law or the insurance contract. It is thus hoped that the
Florida Supreme Court will take the lead in this area by adopting
this refreshing approach to the issue.
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APPENDIX A: CLIENT STATUS IN THE STATES
1. Jurisdictions Recognizing Dual-Client Status in the
Tripartite Relationship
JURISDICTION

Alabama

AUTHORITY
Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533 So. 2d 194, 198 (Ala.
1988) (stating that when insurance company
retains attorney to defend action against insured,
attorney represents insured as well as insurer in
furthering the interests of each other).

Alaska

Home Indem. Co. v. Lane Powell Moss & Miller, 43
F.3d 1322, 1330 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that
insured and insurer are both represented by the
attorney as long as there is no conflict of interest).

Arizona

Paradigm Ins. Co. v. The Longerman Law Offices,
P.A., 2001 Ariz. LEXS 87 (Ariz. 2001) (explaining
that where there is no conflict a defense attorney
can represent both the insurer and insured, and the
attorney owes a duty to both).

California

Gulf Ins. Co. v. Berger, Kahn, Shafton, Moss,
Figler, Simon & Gladstone, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534,
542 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (recognizing that the
attorney has two clients: the insured and insurer).

Delaware

Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins.
Co., 623 A.2d 1118, 1124 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992)
(discussing the relationship among different
defendants to determine whether documents were
privileged; court suggests the attorney may
represent both the insurer and insured).

District of
Columbia

National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 384 F.2d 316, 317-18 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (finding
that the attorney acted as insurer’s representative
while defending insured).

Florida

In re Proposed Addition to the Additional Rules
Governing Conduct of Attorneys in Fla., 220 So. 2d
6, 8 (Fla. 1969) (finding that both salaried and nonsalaried insurance attorneys may represent insurer
and insured if there is no conflict).
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JURISDICTION

AUTHORITY

Georgia

Coscia v. Cunningham, 299 S.E.2d 880, 881 (Ga.
1983) (recognizing that an attorney represents both
the insured and insurer).

Hawaii

Finley v. Home Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 1145, 1152 (Haw.
1998) (attorney can not represent both insurer and
insured when there is a conflict, and citing
authority that attorney represents them both when
there is no conflict).

Idaho

Pendlebury v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 P.2d
129, 134 (Idaho 1965) (recognizing that the
attorney may represent both; when there is a
conflict, the attorney may be in an awkward
situation and cannot take a position adverse to the
interest of his client).

Illinois

Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus
Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322, 329 (Ill. 1991)
(“[W]hen insurer retains attorney to defend
insured, attorney represents both insured and
insurer in furthering the interests of each.”).

Indiana

Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Wills, 717 N.E.2d 151, 160-61
(Ind. 1999) (recognizing that the attorney
represents both the insured and insurer; dual
representation is permissible even when the
attorney was in-house counsel for the insurer,
because their interests are aligned).

Iowa

Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 87 N.W.2d 920,
923 (Iowa 1958) (stating that the attorney
represented both the insured and insurer, and the
fact that another selects and pays for the attorney
does not control the attorney-client relationship),
cited with approval in Squealer Feeds v. Pickering,
530 N.W.2d 678, 684 (Iowa 1995).

Kansas

Glenn v. Fleming, 781 P.2d 1107, 1113 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1989) (finding that the insured’s attorney
represented insurer as well, and insurer had a right
to control and direct the litigation), aff’d in part &
rev’d in part, 799 P.2d 79 (Kan. 1990).
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JURISDICTION

AUTHORITY

Louisiana

Hodges v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 433
So. 2d 125, 132 (La. 1983) (recognizing that the
attorney represented both the insurer and insured);
Brasseaux v. Girouard, 214 So. 2d 401, 409 (La. Ct.
App. 1968) (finding that an attorney may
simultaneously represent the insured and insurer).

Maryland

Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. McConnaughy, 179 A.2d 117,
121 (Md. 1962) (stating that an attorney can
represent insured and insurer unless a conflict
develops).

Massachusetts

McCourt Co. v. FPC Properties, Inc., 434 N.E.2d
1234, 1235 (Mass. 1982) (“The law firm is attorney
for the insured as well as the insurer.”).

Minnesota

Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kleman, 255 N.W.2d 231,
232 (Minn. 1977) (finding “no conflict of interest in
the representation of an insurance company and an
insured by a single law firm”).

Mississippi

Moeller v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 707 So.
2d 1062, 1070 (Miss. 1996) (recognizing that an
attorney has two separate and distinct clients, the
insured and the insurer); Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255, 265 (Miss.
1988) (recognizing that the attorney may represent
the insured and insurer, but insured’s interests are
paramount if a conflict arises).

Missouri

In re Allstate Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Mo.
1987) (stating that an attorney may represent the
insured and the insurer).
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JURISDICTION

AUTHORITY

Nebraska

Hawkeye Cas. Co. v. Stoker, 48 N.W.2d 623, 632
(Neb. 1951) (stating attorney can not represent
both insurer and insured when their interests
conflict); Shahan v. Hilker, 488 N.W.2d 577, 581
(Neb. 1992) (“‘[C]ommunication made by an insured
to his liability insurance company, concerning an
event which may be made the basis of a claim
against him covered by the policy, is a privileged
communication, as being between attorney and
client, if the policy requires the company to defend
him through its attorney, and the communication is
intended for the information or assistance of the
attorney in so defending him.’”).

Nevada

Campbell v. Maestro, 996 P.2d 412, 414 (Nev. 2000)
(explaining that a “dual agency” relationship exists
between the insured, insurer, and attorney, and the
insurer has the right to control the litigation);
Stubli v. Big D Int’l Trucks, Inc., 810 P.2d 785, 788
(Nev. 1991) (Rose, J., dissenting) (recognizing
attorney represents insured and insurer).

New
Hampshire

Dumas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 A.2d
781, 784 (N.H. 1971) (finding communications
between insurer and insured and the attorney were
not privileged as between them because they were
both clients of the attorney in the previous action).

New Jersey

Lieberman v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 419 A.2d
417, 424 (N.J. 1980) (recognizing attorney has two
clients, the insured and insurer unless a conflict
arises, then the attorney may not continue to
represent both); Gray v. Commercial Union Ins.
Co., 468 A.2d 721, 725 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1983).

New York

Goldberg v. American Home Assurance Co., 439
N.Y.S.2d 2, 4 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (stating
attorney represented both insurer and insured).
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JURISDICTION

AUTHORITY

Ohio

Netzley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 296 N.E.2d
550, 561 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971) (“We hold that both
Nationwide [the insurer] as well as . . . its insured,
were clients of the legal counsel retained by
Nationwide.”).

Oregon

In re Conduct of O’Neal, 683 P.2d 1352, 1356 (Or.
1984) (referencing dual representation of insurer
and insured as example of situations where
attorney can represent multiple clients if it is
obvious the lawyer can represent the interests of
each client without conflict).

Pennsylvania

Swedloff v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 187 A.2d 152,
152-53 (Pa. 1963) (referring to the insurance
company and the insured as clients of the attorney);
Molitoris v. Woods, 618 A.2d 985, 989 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992) (recognizing attorney can represent both
an insured and insurer’s subrogation interest).

Rhode Island

Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 240 A.2d 397, 403
(R.I. 1968) (finding that if there is no conflict, or the
insured consents, an attorney may represent both
the insured and the insurer), abrogated on other
grounds by Peerless Ins. Co. v. Viegas, 667 A.2d
785 (R.I. 1995).

South Carolina

Chitty v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 36 F.R.D
37, 41-42 (E.D.S.C. 1964) (recognizing attorney
represented insurer and insured; therefore,
communications were not privileged).

Vermont

In re Illuzzi, 632 A.2d 346, 355 (Vt. 1993) (finding
plaintiff’s attorney violated ethics rules by speaking
directly to insurer instead of communicating
through the attorney hired to defend insured;
dissent as to sanction affirms that, at the beginning
of the litigation, an attorney may represent both an
insured and insurer, but if a conflict arises, he may
only represent the insured).
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JURISDICTION

AUTHORITY

Virginia

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Floyd, 366 S.E.2d
93, 97 (Va. 1988) (“During their representation of
both insurer and insured, attorneys have the duty
to convey settlement offers to the insured . . . .”);
Norman v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 239 S.E.2d 902,
907 (Va. 1978) (“[A]n insurer’s attorney, employed
to represent an insured, is bound by the same high
standards . . . .”).

Washington

Barry v. USAA, 989 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1999) (noting that normally an attorney
operates on behalf of two clients, the insurer and
the insured).

Wisconsin

Roeske v. Deifenbach, 226 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Wis.
1975) (recognizing the attorney represented both
the insured and insurer, but on appeal this was not
appropriate because there was a conflict of
interest).

Wyoming

Suchta v. Robinett, 596 P.2d 1380, 1385 (Wyo.
1979) (suggesting an attorney represents insurer
and insured: “Both clients, the paying one and the
one who had the company’s attorney assigned to
him . . . .”).
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2. Jurisdictions Apparently Rejecting Dual-Client Status in the
Tripartite Relationship
JURISDICTION

AUTHORITY

Connecticut

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
730 A.2d 51, 63 (Conn. 1999) (stating the attorney’s
duty is to his client, the insured, and not to the
insurer); but see King v. Guiliani, No. CV920290380-S, 1993 WL 284462, at *6 (Conn. Super.
July 27, 1993) (stating attorney can represent
insurer and insured unless conflict arises).

Kentucky

American Ins. Ass’n v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 917
S.W.2d 568, 572 (Ky. 1996) (refusing to disturb
ethics opinion, the court stated that the interests of
the insured and the insurer are not always alike,
and the attorney’s duty is to the insured, not the
one who is paying him, the insurer); but see Moore
v. Roberts ex rel. Roberts, 684 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky.
1982) (acknowledging that the insured and insurer
were represented by the same counsel and strongly
advising attorney that the attorney choose one
client where conflict such as coverage dispute
exists).

Michigan

Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bronson Plating
Co., 496 N.W.2d 373, 378 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)
(stating that “[n]o attorney-client relationship
exists between an insurance company and the
attorney representing the insurance company’s
insured”), aff’d, 519 N.W.2d 864 (Mich. 1994);
Atlanta Int’l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W.2d 294 (Mich.
1991).

Montana

In re Rules of Prof’l Conduct & Insurer Imposed
Billing Rules & Procedures, 2 P.3d 806, 814 (Mont.
2000) (holding that “the insured is the sole client of
defense counsel”).

Texas

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980
S.W.2d 625, 627 (Tex. 1998) (stating insured is
client; however, specifically stating that insurer
may control defense and steps into the “shoes of the
client” if there is no conflict of interest).
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State ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gaughan, 508
S.E.2d 75, 88 (W. Va. 1998) (disagreeing with the
majority view that attorney represents both the
insurer and the insured; instead, the attorney
represents the insured).
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APPENDIX B: BAR ASSOCIATIONS’ ETHICS OPINIONS
JURISDICTION
United States
of America
Alabama

Alaska

AUTHORITY
American Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 01-421 (2001).
Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm’n, Formal Op.
RO-98-02 (1998), LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP
File.
Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 99-1
(1999), WESTLAW, AK Eth. Op. 99-1.

Colorado

Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 107
(1999), http://www.cobar.org/comms/ethics/fo/
fo_107.htm (last visited June 22, 2001); Colo. Bar
Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 91 (1993),
http://www.cobar.org/comms/ethics/fo/fo_91.htm
(last visited June 22, 2001).

Connecticut

Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal
Op. 94-5 (1994), WESTLAW, CT. Eth. Op. 94-5.

District of
Columbia

Hawaii

D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 290 (1999),
LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File.
Haw. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., Formal Op. 36
(1999), http://www.hsba.org/Hawaii/Admin/Disc/
36.htm (last visited June 22, 2001); Haw. Sup. Ct.
Disciplinary Bd., Formal Op. 37 (1999), http://www.
hsba.org/Hawaii/Admin/Disc/37.htm (last visited
June 22, 2001).

Idaho

Idaho State Bar Ass’n Bd. of Comm’rs, Formal
Ethics Op. 136 (1999) (on file with the Idaho State
Bar).

Illinois

Ill. State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. on Prof’l Conduct
98-08 (1999), WESTLAW, IL Adv. Op. 98-08.

Indiana

Ind. State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 3
(1998), LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File; Ind.
State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 4 (1998),
LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File.
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JURISDICTION

AUTHORITY

Iowa

Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op.
99-01 (1999), LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File.

Kentucky

Ky. Bar Ass’n, Advisory Ethics Op. E-404 (1998),
LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File.

Louisiana

La. State Bar Ass’n Ethics Advisory Serv. Comm.,
unnumbered advisory opinion, reprinted in LSBA
Ethics Advisory Service Committee Renders NonBinding Opinions, 45 LA. B.J. 438 (1998) (Question
3), LEXIS, LEGNEW Library, LOUBAR File.

Maine

Me. Prof. Ethics Comm’n of the Bd. of Overseers of
the Bar, Op. 164 (1998) (on file with the Me. Bar
Ass’n), summarized in J. Scott Davis, Bd. of
Overseers of the Bar, Bar Counsel’s 1998 Annual
Report, 14 ME. B.J. 284, 290 (1999), LEXIS,
LEGNEW Library, MEBARJ File.

Maryland

Md. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Ethics
Docket 99-7 (1999), LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP
File; Md. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Ethics
Docket 00-23 (2000), LEXIS, Ethics Library,
ETHOP File.

Mississippi

Miss. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 246 (1999), LEXIS,
Ethics Library, ETHOP File; Miss. Bar Ethics
Comm., Op. 211 (1993), LEXIS, Ethics Library,
ETHOP File.

Missouri

Mo. Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel,
Informal Advisory Op. 980,188 (1998), http://www.
mobar.net/opinions/search.htm (last visited June
22, 2001).

Montana

Mont. State Bar, Ethics Op. 900,517 (1990),
http://www.montanabar.org/ethics/ethicsopinions/9
00517.html (last visited June 22, 2001).

New York

N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op.
716 (1999), WESTLAW, NY Eth. Op. 716.

North Carolina

N.C. State Bar, 98 Formal Ethics Op. 10 (1998),
WESTLAW, 1998 NC Eth. Op. 10.
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Ohio

Oregon
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AUTHORITY
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Ethics and Prof’l
Responsibility Comm., Ethics Inquiry 98-99-02
(1998) (on file with the Cincinnati Bar Ass’n).
Or. State Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 1999-157 (1999),
WESTLAW, OR. Eth. Op. 1999-157.

Pennsylvania

Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l
Responsibility, Informal Op. 98-32 (1998),
WESTLAW, PA Eth. Op. 98-32.

Rhode Island

R.I. Sup. Ct. Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 99-17
(1999), LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File; R.I.
Sup. Ct. Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 99-18 (1999),
LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File.

South Carolina

S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 98-36 (1998),
LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File.

South Dakota

S.D. State Bar, Ethics Op. 99-2 (1999), http://www.
sdbar.org/members/ethics/1999/eo99-02.htm (last
visited June 22, 2001).

Tennessee

Tenn. Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, Formal
Ethics Op. 99-F-143(a) (1999), WESTLAW, TN Eth.
Op. 99-F-143(a); Tenn. Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 99-F-143 (1999),
WESTLAW, TN Eth. Op. 99-F-143.

Utah

Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op.
98-03 (1998), WESTLAW, UT Eth. Op. 98-03.

Vermont

Vt. Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Advisory Ethics
Op. 98-7 (1998), LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP
File.

Virginia

Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1723
(1998), LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File.

Washington

Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 195 (1999),
http://www.wsba.org/c/RPC/fo/195.htm (last visited
June 23, 2001).
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AUTHORITY

West Virginia

W. Va. State Bar Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., Legal
Ethics Op. 99-02 (1999), LEXIS, Ethics Library,
ETHOP File.

Wisconsin

Wis. State Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. E99-1 (1999), LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File.
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APPENDIX C: COMPARING THE STATEMENT OF INSURED CLIENT’S RIGHTS
WITH ETHICS OPINIONS AND THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT DECISION
THE STATEMENT OF INSURED
CLIENT’S RIGHTS:

MANY BAR ETHICS OPINIONS AND
THE MONTANA DECISION:

States that an attorney, at the
outset of the representation,
should determine if the attorney
will be representing both the
insured and the insurer. See
IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at
21.

Analyze aspects of the
relationship between the attorney
and the insured as if the insured
is the only client. See, e.g., In re
Rules of Prof’l Conduct and
Insurer Imposed Billing Rules
and Procedures, 2 P.3d 806, 814
(Mont. 2000).

States that under most policies,
the insurer pays all fees and costs
of defending the claim. See IPSSC
REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.

Prohibit an attorney from
accepting compensation from the
insurer under certain
circumstances even if the insured
agrees. See, e.g., In re Rules of
Prof’l Conduct, 2 P.3d at 817.

States that, under most policies,
the insurance company will
control the defense and the
attorney will take instructions
from the insurance company. See
IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at
18.

Ignore this contractual
relationship and the law
approving the insurance contract.
See, e.g., Ala. State Bar
Disciplinary Comm’n, Formal Op.
RO-98-02 (1998).

States the insured clients may
communicate their preferences to
the attorney. See IPSSC REPORT,
supra note 1, at 18.

Provide vague standards for
determining when a guideline
impairs an attorney’s professional
judgment and thus effectively
allow the attorney to both
determine the governing
standard and dictate how a case
is to be conducted without regard
to the insurer’s or insured clients’
preferences. See, e.g., Wis. State
Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Ethics
Op. E-99-1 (1999).
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THE STATEMENT OF INSURED
CLIENT’S RIGHTS:

MANY BAR ETHICS OPINIONS AND
THE MONTANA DECISION:

States that the attorney, upon
request by the insured, is to
explain the guidelines to the
insured or provide them with a
copy of the guidelines;
additionally states that the
attorney must tell the insured if
the attorney is denied
authorization to provide a service
or undertake an action the
attorney believes necessary. See
IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at
18.

Prohibit certain guidelines
regardless of insured client
agreement. See, e.g., Wash. State
Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 195 (1999).

Informs the insured that the
attorney may be required to
withdraw from the representation
if an actual conflict arises. See
IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at
19.

Presume a nonwaivable conflict
in the presence of certain
guidelines. See, e.g., Wash. State
Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 195 (1999).

Recognizes that the release of
confidential information to a
third-party auditor does not
necessarily waive or jeopardize
available privileges, and thus
informs the insured that the
attorney will advise the insured if
the attorney believes a bill review
or other action releases
information in a manner that is
contrary to the insured’s
interests. See IPSSC REPORT,
supra note 1, at 19.

Presume that the release of
confidential information is
detrimental to the insured client
and require that the insured
must be contacted each time any
information will be released. See,
e.g., Utah State Bar Ethics
Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 98-03
(1998).

Provides that the attorney is
responsible for identifying
conflicts of interest. See IPSSC
REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.

Presume a conflict of interest.
See, e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of
Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op. 9901 (1999).
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THE STATEMENT OF INSURED
CLIENT’S RIGHTS:

MANY BAR ETHICS OPINIONS AND
THE MONTANA DECISION:

Informs the insured of the
possibility of an excess judgment.
See IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1,
at 19.

Do not address the difference
between settlements within
policy limits and settlements
exceeding policy limits.

States that there is a potential for
ethical conflicts any time another
person or client is paying for the
representation. See IPSSC
REPORT, supra note 1, at 20.

Presume an actual conflict and
fail to recognize numerous other
situations where one client pays
for and controls the litigation.
See, e.g., Idaho State Bar Ass’n
Bd. of Comm’rs, Formal Ethics
Op. 136 (1999).

Acknowledges that it is
impractical to require the
attorney to obtain the insured
client’s signature. See IPSSC
REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.

Require specific consent. See, e.g.,
Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory
Op. Comm., Op. 98-03 (1998).

